Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Utah v. Derren Berriel : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Counsel for Respondent.
Douglas J. Thompson; Counsel for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Berriel, No. 20110926 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2983

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

\

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

^
r

Respondent,
:

•

vs.

,

'

\

Case No: 20110926-SC
v

i •

DARREN BERRIEL,

'

r

'

Petitioner.

'" "

"

BRIEF OF PETITIONER / DEFENDANT UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARO

CERTIORARI REVIEW FROM DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Counsel for Respondent

DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON (12690)
Utah County Public Defender Association
Appeals Division
51 South University Ave., Suite 206
Provo, UT 84601
Tel: (801) 852-1070
Counsel for Petitioner

Oral Argument Requested
Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Utah County Jail
UTAH APPELLATE CQUR

FEB 2 4 2012
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No: 20110926-SC

DARREN BERRIEL,
Petitioner.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER / DEFENDANT UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARO

CERTIORARI REVIEW FROM DECISION OF TFIE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Counsel for Respondent

DOUGLAS J. THOMPSON (12690)
Utah County Public Defender Association
Appeals Division
51 South University Ave., Suite 206
Provo, UT 84601
Tel: (801) 852-1070
Counsel for Petitioner

Oral Argument Requested
Appellant is currently incarcerated at the Utah County Jail

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A. Nature of the Case

2

B. Trial Court and Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

13

ARGUMENT
I. The majority of the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
refusal to instruct the jury on defense of a third person
Relevant Law

13
13

Utah cases

15

Cases in other jurisdictions

23

Application

30

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
ADDENDA

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

42

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutory Provisions
UTAH CODE

§ 78A-3-102

1

UTAH CODE

§ 76-2-402

1,6,13,14,40

UTAH CODE

§ 76-5-103

2

Cases
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460 (Utah 1999)
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E. 951 (Mass. 1998)
Harris v. Scully, 779 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1985)
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cnty., 2011 UT 18, 251 P.3d 804
Hudson v. State, 956 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App. 1997)
People v. Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646 (111. 1997)
Renderv. State, 341 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. App. 2011)
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980)
State v. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, — P.3d —
State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969)
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983)
State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980)

1
23
30,31,32
1
23,27
24,28,29
24
15,17,18,34,35,36
passim
15,18,19
24
14,22

State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, 18 P.3d 1123

21,22,37

State v. Hernandez, 861 P.2d 814 (Kan. 1993)

32,33,34

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d211 (Utah 1985)
State v. Solomon, 930 A.2d 716 (Conn. App. 2007)

16,17,36,37
23,24,25

State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315

20

State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981)

17

State v. Stone, 629 P.2d 442 (Utah 1981)

14

State v. Sullivan, 695 A.2d 115 (Maine 1997)
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980)

23,25,26,27
14,15,17

State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977)

17

State v. Zumwalt, 973 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. App. 1998)

23

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
ii may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
vs.

Case No: 20110926-SC

DARREN BERRIEL,
Defendant / Petitioner.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER / DEFENDANT UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
icickic

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §
78A-3-102(5).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1. Whether a majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming
the district court's refusal to give a jury instruction on defense of another person pursuant
to Utah Code § 76-2-402. On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court." Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d
460, 461 (Utah 1999). The court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. Harold
Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cnty., 2011 UT 18,115, 251 P.3d 804.
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code §§ 76-2-402 and 76-5-103 are set forth in full in the Addenda.1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Defendant, Darren Berriel, appeals from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
affirming in part the rulings and orders of the Honorable Gary D. Stott and the Honorable
David N. Mortensen, following Berriel's conviction, judgment and sentencing on one
count of aggravated assault under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-103.
B. Trial Court and Court of Appeals Proceedings and Disposition
On October 3, 2008 Darren Berriel was charged by information with
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, RIOT, and POSSESSION OF A DEADLY WEAPON W/
INTENT TO ASSAULT, each count raised one degree by a gang enhancement, at his
initial appearance and was appointed a public defender. R. 11-12.
The case was assigned to Judge Gary D. Stott who held a preliminary hearing on
October 30, 2008. R. 141. At the preliminary hearing the State moved to dismiss count 2,
RIOT, which the court granted. R. 141: 44-45.

Defense counsel argued that the gang

enhancement should not be bound over. R. 141: 45-46. Defense counsel also argued a
defense to the assault by a lawful use of force to protect another person from imminent
harm. R. 141: 46. The court found probable cause to believe the defendant committed
1

The trial court's decision in question took place on March 31, 2009. Since that time,
Utah Code §76-2-402 has been amended, however the changes do not seem affect
Defendant's claims. See 2010 Utah Laws Ch. 324 (H.B. 263) and 2010 Utah Laws Ch.
361 (H.B. 78) (the changes appear only to make the statute gender neutral and renumber
several of the subsections). This brief will refer to the current version.
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both the aggravated assault and the possession of deadly weapon with intent to assault. R.
141: 47. The court found there was enough evidence to support the gang enhancement
based on a written statement admitted through the police officer. R. 141: 48. Finally, the
court found insufficient evidence to support the defense of a third person. R. 141: 48.
On November 6, 2008 the court held an entry of plea hearing. R. 26, 142. The
court addressed defense counsel's objection to the gang enhancement being based on a
written statement presented by the police. R. 142: 3-4. The court modified its bind over
by striking the gang enhancement because, after reviewing the rule, it found that
"although Paragraph 9 [of Rule 1102] indicates other hearsay evidence with similar
indicia or reliability regardless of admissibility at trial, can be received, [the court] didn't
have any basis on which to conclude that this statement could be classified as reliability
[sic] to support bind over." R. 142: 3-4.
Following the court's modification, the State requested a new preliminary hearing
in order to produce evidence supporting the gang enhancement. R. 142: 6. The court
granted that request and scheduled a second preliminary hearing on December 4, 2008.
Berriel waived the second preliminary hearing and he entered not guilty pleas to counts 1
and 3 on December 4, 2008 and the gang enhancement was not readdressed. R. 31.
On March 18, 2009 Berriel filed requested jury instructions, which included
instructions defining justification of force necessary for self-defense and defense of a
third person. R. 39-35.
Defense counsel objected to the admission of the written statement of Mr. Carlisle, who
was at the scene, arguing that Rule 1102 requires a warning against perjury in order to be
admitted at a preliminary hearing. R. 141:41.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Following the close of the State's evidence defense counsel moved for a directed
verdict and a motion to merge Count 2 into Count I.3 R. 144: 262-63. The court denied
the directed verdict motion ruling that Berriel had not met the burden of establishing that
there was no evidence that raised a question of material fact. R. 144: 263. The court
denied Berriers merger request stating that when Berriel used the weapon he placed
himself in jeopardy of the assault charge and the two charges are "not one in the same
charge." R. 144:264.
After the defense rested the parties argued about Berriers proposed jury
instructions on use of force for self-defense and defense of a third person. R. 144: 276-87.
The court denied Berriel's request for a self-defense instruction stating "the evidence
clearly establishes that defendant initially provoked the confrontation as an excuse to
confront for whatever reason..." R. 144: 288. The court denied Berriel's request for a
defense of a third person stating "[t]here was no evidence that at the time that Luis got
out of the car, that [the third person] at that time was doing anything to call the defendant,
to ask the defendant, to seek her immediate protection as required by the statute." R. 144:
289.
The court returned from a break and changed its ruling with respect to the jury
instructions. It noted that there was enough evidence to justify instructing the jury on the
issue of self-defense but not on the issue of defense of a third person. R. 144: 294. The

3

The first information charged 3 counts. Count 1 was AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
Count 2 was RIOT, and Count 3 was POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON W/
INTENT TO ASSAULT. The RIOT charge was dismissed and at trial Count 3 was
renumbered as Count 2.
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court then provided modified versions of BerriePs requested instructions for self-defense,
retreat, actual danger, and burden of proof excluding any mention of defense of a third
person. R. 110, 109, 108, 106. The court made it clear that Berriel "can't use the claim
that [the third person] was getting beat up" as justification for his actions because there
was "not a reasonable basis to justify instructing the jury for defense of another." R. 144:
297,304-05.
Following

deliberations,

the jury

found

Berriel

guilty

on

Count

1,

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, and guilty on Count 2, POSSESSION OF A DEADLY
WEAPON WITH INTENT TO ASSAULT. R. 144: 348-50.
On July 16, 2009 Darren Berriel was sentenced to 0 to 5 years in the Utah State
Prison for the 3 rd degree felony aggravated assault, and one year in the Utah County Jail
for the Class A misdemeanor possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault. Those
sentences were suspended. Berriel was placed on probation for 36 months and ordered to
serve 270 days in jail with credit of 35 days for time served and ordered to pay a $991
fine. R. 145: 12-14.
On August 14, 2009 Berriel filed his timely Notice of Appeal. R. 128.
On September 15, 2011, a majority of the court of appeals panel affirmed Berriel's
conviction for AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, concluding that "while there was some
evidence that Berriel had information that led him to believe [the victim] had been violent
toward [the third person] in the past... a jury could not reasonably have concluded that
the nature or immediacy of the danger to [the third person] reasonably justified a belief
that it was probable that [the victim] was about to use 'unlawful force' against [the third
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

person]." State v. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, f 6, — P.3d — . 4 In essence, the majority
found that the evidence did not show the threat was imminent.
Judge Thorne wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion finding that the questions
of imminence and reasonableness are expressly assigned "to the 'trier of fact'". Berriel,
2011 UT App 317, % 20. He added, "[a] reasonable jury could easily conclude from this
testimony that, at the time Berriel spoke with [the third person] on the phone, she was in
imminent danger..." and "once Berriel had a reasonable basis to believe that [the third
person] was in imminent danger due to her phone call, his actions in her defense were
potentially justifiable under Utah Code section 76-2-402 until such time as Berriel had
reason to believe that the danger to [the third person] had passed." Id., atfflf22-23.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Luis Trejo is 22 years old. R. 143: 112. He lives with his girlfriend, Rachel
Southwick, who is pregnant with his child. R. 143: 87, 108-09. Rachel is 16 years old,
lives with her mother, stepfather, brother, and boyfriend Luis in Orem. R. 143: 130.
According to Luis, he has never hit Rachel but he did push her on to the couch during a
fight, after the incident with Berriel. R. 143: 109. According to Rachel, Luis has
smacked her, pushed her head against the wall, and pushed her into the car causing a scar
on her face. R. 143: 131-32. According to Luis, Rachel got that scar because she kicked
4

The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated Berriel's conviction for POSSESSION OF
A DEADLY WEAPON WITH INTENT TO ASSAULT, finding that "because 'the
[arguments,] instructions[,] and evidence at trial' did not clearly inform the jury that it
had to find a separate factual basis for the possession [charge] beyond the possession
necessary to commit the aggravated assault, his conviction for possession of the knife
with intent to assault is not independently sustainable. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, f 16
(citing State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, f 23, 71 P.3d 624).
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the car door and it hit her in the face. R. 143: 111. Luis said that he has never hit Rachel
and does not know why she was telling people he had. R. 143: 125. Rachel told her
friend Krissy Ferre about being abused. R. 143: 179, 180. On one occasion Krissy
witnessed Luis throw Rachel across the room. R. 143: 179.
Rachel knows Darren Berriel from school. They were friends and she stayed
overnight at his house once. R. 143: 135-36. Rachel was close to Berriel and she talked
to him about things going on in her life. R. 143: 152. Rachel cannot remember telling
Berriel about being abused by Luis but she remembers testifying at the preliminary
hearing that she told Berriel about the abuse and that it made Berriel mad. R. 143: 14850. On one occasion Rachel went to Bernel's house to tell him about the abuse she was
receiving from Luis. R. 143: 151. Rachel also told her friend Krissy Ferre about the
abuse and went with Krissy to the police to report the abuse but was told the police could
not do anything without proof. R. 143: 154. Scott Carlisle, a friend of Berriel and
Rachel, knew Rachel had been abused and has seen her come to school with black eyes.
R. 144: 260. Krissy testified that Rachel called Berriel on the day of the incident but did
not know what the call was about. R. 143: 202. Sometime before the incident, Luis
smacked Rachel and she called Berriel and told him about it. R. 143: 160.
Luis knows Darren Berriel. They used to be friends but they lost touch and had
not seen each other for some time before the night of the incident. R. 143: 95. Luis is
about four years older than BerrieL R. 143: 112. He was approximately 180 pounds and
5 feet 4 inches. R. 143: 115. Luis used to hang out with the guys in "801", what Luis
called a party crew. R. 143: 113. According to Sergeant William Young, the Orem Gang
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Unit Supervisor, 801 is a street gang that Luis used to hang with but Young was not
aware of Luis being involved in any gang activity in the last few years. R. 143: 127-29.
A few weeks before the night of the incident Luis and Rachel went to Berriers
house. R. 143: 95. They went there because Luis had returned home from work Rachel
was not home and she later told Luis she had been with Berriel. R. 143: 96. When
Rachel told Luis she had stayed the night with Berriel Luis got angry. R. 143: 134, 137.
They went to Berriers so Luis could confront him about whether she had been with
Berriel and to see what was going on. R. 143: 97. When they got to BerriePs house his
father, David Berriel, answered the door and told Luis that Darren was not home. R. 143:
97. According to David, when Luis showed up at the house Luis skid his car across his
David's lawn. R. 144: 269. Darren Berriel was actually at home but David said he was
not because Luis was angry and he was trying to protect his son. R. 144: 271.
While Luis was at the door David saw a girl get our of Luis's car. Luis yelled at
her to get back in the car and then grabbed her and violently threw her in the car. R. 144:
270. According to Luis, he was helping Rachel into the car and he did not push her. R.
143: 98, 110. According to Rachel, Luis got mad because she got out of the car so he
pushed her in the back pretty hard, forcing her to hit the car, causing the scar on her nose.
R. 143: 133.
On the night in question, before the incident, Luis answered several phone calls
from Berriel. At first Luis did not know who was calling but later recognized the voice
as BerriePs. R. 143: 90. On the phone Berriel asked Luis if he was an R.J., a member of
a local street gang. R. 143: 90. According to Luis, Berriel is a member of the South
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Town Gang. R. 143: 93. During the phone call they did not discuss Rachel; instead they
cursed at each other and then Luis hung up. R. 143: 91. Berriel called back several times
and Luis again hung up on him. R. 143: 92. Luis said he was not angry with Rachel
when Berriel called but he did ask her how Berriel got the phone number. R. 143: 98,
118.
Later that night, around 8:30, Luis took Rachel to pick up her little brother at a
friend's house to bring him home. According to Luis, he and Rachel were having normal
conversations during the drive and Luis did not know that Rachel was telling Berriel
about being abused. R. 143: 94, 116. Eric, Rachel's brother, does not remember whether
anyone was talking on the ride home, or whether or not anyone was angry. R. 143: 166.
Rachel testified that Luis was not angry during the drive and there was not any fighting or
abuse that day. R. 143: 139, 138. However, Rachel did tell Krissy that Luis had elbowed
her in the chest that day. R. 143: 202. Rachel remembered testifying at the preliminary
hearing that she called Berriel shortly before the incident and told him that Luis had been
hurting her; she asked him to come over and help her. R. 143: 150. After talking to
Berriel, Rachel believed he was going to come over and talk with Luis but not hurt him.
R. 143: 150.
That evening Berriel and some of his friends were hanging out, planning to go to
the movies. R. 144: 240. The group of friends consisted of Miguel, Isaac, Aaron, Berriel
and Scott. R. 144: 243. Berriel's friend, Isaac Torres, was in the back seat of Berriel's
car when Berriel got a phone call. R. 144: 241. Berriel's friend Scott Carlisle had the
phone and he saw on caller ID that it was Rachel who was calling. R. 144: 255. Scott
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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heard a girl screaming on the phone then Berriel walked away to talk. R. 144: 255-56.
Based on the screams Scott thought Rachel was being beaten right then. R. 144: 260.
Berriel returned and said they were going to Rachel's house because she was getting beat
up. R. 144:256,261.
Rachel called Berriel "shortly before the fight" and "told him that Luis had been
hurting [her]." R. 143: 150. She called Berriel and told him "Luis was hurting [her] again
and asked [Berriel] to help [her] and [she] thought [Berriel] was going to come over and
talk to Luis." R. 143: 152. She knew Berriel was coming over to confront Luis about the
abuse. R. 143: 150. Rachel's testimony was unclear as to exactly when the phone call
took place. See R. 143: 203-04 (she did not have a clear memory of when the phone call
occurred but she did not make any calls from the car or right before she left), but see R.
143: 205-06 (she remembered testifying that she called Berriel shortly before the fight).
Immediately after the call Berriel and his friends went to Rachel's house instead of
going to the movies. R. 144: 242, 143: 215. Berriel told his friends that Luis had been
hitting Rachel. R. 144: 242. According to Miguel, they were going to help a friend who
had told them her boyfriend was hitting her. R. 143: 212-13. Berriel called Krissy and
told her he was going to Rachel's house and that Krissy needed to get Rachel away from
the house. R. 143: 181.
According to Isaac, when they got to Rachel's house Isaac did not really know
what was going to happen or what was actually going on. Isaac and Aaron were just
standing on the street corner talking until a car showed up. R. 144: 243. Scott testified
that when they got to Rachel's house no one was there but as they walked back to the car
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Luis's car drove up. R. 256. Rachel said she saw Miguel, Scott and Isaac with Berriel. R.
143: 140. Luis said he saw 6 or 7 guys in addition to Berriel. R. 143: 99, 120.
When the Luis' got to Rachel's house it stopped and Luis jumped out of the car
and ran toward Berriel. R. 144: 256. Rachel said she and her brother got out of the car
and her friends, Krissy and Daniel, were there too. R. 143: 141-42. According to Luis, he
got out of the car and walked toward Berriel telling him "You don't need a knife to fight
me." R. 143: 100-01, 121. Luis also told Berriel, "You don't know what's going on, stay
out of it." R. 144: 266. Eric saw Luis walk toward Berriel. R. 143: 167. Scott saw Luis
jump out of the car and run toward Berriel, Berriel stepped back and Luis kept coming so
Berriel swung at him. R. 144: 257. Luis testified that Berriel threw something and then
stabbed at Luis catching him on the arm with a folding pocket-knife. R. 143: 101. Rachel
and Eric saw Luis and Berriel in the street; Rachel did not see a knife but she saw the
stabbing motion. R. 143: 143, 168. Krissy saw Berriel stab Luis. R. 143: 185. Luis
testified that at the time of the stabbing Rachel was about 15 to 20 feet from the
confrontation. R. 143: 105. Eric testified that at the time of the confrontation Rachel was
"kinda close" to him (R. 143: 170, (although he didn't see where she went (R. 143:
167))), approximately the distance from the State's attorney to the witness box (R. 143:
171), and he, Eric, was about 15 yards from Berriel and Luis, or approximately the
distance from the lectem in the courtroom to the witness (R. 143: 174).
According to Luis, after he was stabbed he ran to the back yard to get his dog
because it was not a fair fight. R. 143: 106. When he returned Berriel and his friends
were gone so Luis put the dog in his car and went look for them. R. 143: 106. Rachel
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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saw Luis get his dog and go after Berriel and his friends. R. 143: 145. When Luis came
from the back yard with the dog he got in his car and told Krissy and Rachel to stay there
because he was mad, then he followed Berriel up the hill. R. 143: 185.
The other people who were with Berriel did not do anything. R. 143: 186. Miguel
did not see the stabbing, it looked like they were talking and then Luis started running. R.
143: 211. Isaac said he saw Luis and Berriel talking then he saw them run off so he ran
with Berriel. R. 144: 243-44. According to Scott, after Berriel punched Luis, Luis ran
away so Berriel and his friends ran too. R. 144: 257. They ran to the car and Berriel took
them home. R. 244: 257. Isaac asked Berriel what had happened and Berriel said he
"shanked" Luis. R. 144: 250. Berriel told Isaac he did it because Rachel was crying
because Luis was hitting her so he had no choice. Id.
Rachel said at the moment Berriel stabbed Luis, Luis was not doing anything to
her, he was not hitting her or threatening her. R. 143: 144-45, 142. She testified that at
the moment Berriel stabbed Luis, Luis was not hurting her, she clarified "At that
moment..." R. 143: 144-45. After Luis left with the dog Krissy took Rachel to her house
because when Luis is mad he hits people so she wanted to take Rachel away from him. R.
143: 185.
Luis could not find Berriel so he returned to Rachel's house; when she was not
there he went to Krissy's. R. 143: 107-08. Others took Luis to the hospital where he
received some stitches for his wound. R. 143: 108. Berriel later turned himself in to the
police and was arrested for the assault. R. 143: 223, 230.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Berriel asserts the majority of the court of appeals erred by finding that there was
no reasonable basis upon which the jury could have found a reasonable doubt in the
State's burden to disprove defense of a third person. A defendant is entitled to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to
justify it. Based on the testimony on the record there was evidence to support the theory
that Berriel reasonably believed it was necessary to use force against Luis in order to
protect Rachel from Luis' imminent use of unlawful force. Even though that evidence
may conflict with other evidence, the trial court and the court of appeals should not have
weighed the evidence in order to find any threat was not in fact imminent. Because it is
not unreasonable, based on the testimony, that Berriel could have believed Rachel was in
danger at the time of he confronted Luis, the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury.
If this Court finds the court of appeals' affirmation of the trial court's denial to
instruct the jury on Berriel's theory to be an error this case should be remanded for a new
trial.
ARGUMENT
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON DEFENSE OF
A THIRD PERSON PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE § 76-2-402.
Relevant Law
Utah Code § 76-2-402(1) provides "A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that force
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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or a threat of force is necessary to defend the person or a third person against another
person's imminent use of unlawful force.
Utah Code § 76-2-402(5) authorizes the trier of fact to consider several factors in
determining imminence and reasonableness as it relates to self-defense or defense of
another. The factors are "(a) the nature of the danger; (b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and (e) any patterns of abuse or
violence in the parties' relationship." UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(5). These factors are not
only relevant to the factfinder when deciding reasonableness or imminence but also to a
court when considering whether an issue with respect to self-defense of defense of others
has been raised by the evidence.
A defendant may have the jury instructed on the use of force theory so long as
there is a reasonable basis in evidence to support it.

"The general rule is that a

defendant's entitlement to a jury instruction on his theory of the case is conditioned upon
the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the proposed
instruction." State v. Stone, 629 P.2d 442, 446 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Torres, 619
P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) ("Each party is... entitled to have the jury instructed on the
law applicable to its theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to
justify it"); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980) ("A defendant's entitlement
to a jury instruction on his theory of the case is not absolute. It is necessarily conditioned
upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the giving of the
proposed instruction.").
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Utah Cases This Court "drew the guidelines in this area: If the defendant's evidence, although
in material conflict with the State's proof, be such that the jury may entertain a reasonable
doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to have the jury
instructed fully and clearly on the law of self-defense." State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261,
265 (Utah 1980) {citing State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (1969)). Thus, even where the
evidence does not unanimously support the defendant's theory, he is entitled to have the
jury instructed on the theory if some evidence presented raises a reasonable basis.
The evidence supporting the justification defense need not persuade the trial court
of the reasonable doubt. In fact, when a trial court considers a defendant's request to
instruct the jury on a justification defense the court is not supposed to consider the
relative merit of conflicting evidence, but instead only determine whether some evidence
has been presented which could provide a rational basis for the theory. "We are not
concerned with the reasonableness, nor the credibility of the defendant's evidence relating
to his claim of self-defense. Each party is, however, entitled to have the jury instructed
on the law applicable to its theory of the case if tltiere is any reasonable basis in the
evidence to justify it." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (1980). As soon as evidence
has been presented that, if believed, could support reasonable doubt as to whether the
defendant's conduct was justified, the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed
fully and clearly on the law of justification, whether or not the court believes it or finds it
to be outweighed by conflicting evidence.
This Court in State v. Knoll characterized the amount of evidence required to raise
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the issue to the jury as "some evidence" and stated that "if the issue is raised, whether by
the defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the prosecution has the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [conduct] was not in self-defense." State v. Knoll, 712
P.2d 211, 214-15 (Utah 1985). In Knoll the jury was instructed on self-defense, so it is
quite different than this case where the trial court refused the requested instruction,
however, the Knoll opinion does contain very relevant language. In Knoll the defendant
killed another man and claimed the killing was justified as self-defense. At trial the jury
was instructed on self-defense but the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On
appeal the defendant claimed the state should have been forced to disprove the existence
of self-defense, as a prima facie element of homicide, arguing such an element is
necessary because the statute requires "unlawfully caus[ing] the death of another." Id., at
213 (emphasis added).
This Court rejected that claim but "explicitly and firmly emphasize[d] that [Knoll]
does not alter the long standing law of this State concerning the procedural principles that
govern when and how the issue of self-defense is properly raised and the allocation of the
burden of persuasion with respect to that issue; indeed, we reaffirm those rules." Id., at
214. Those long standing rules include the principle that "when there is a basis in the
evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant,
which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was
done to protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, an instruction
on self-defense should be given the jury. And if the issue is raised, whether by the
defendant's or the prosecution's evidence, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond
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a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense." Id., at 214 (citing State v.
Starts, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980);
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977)).
In Knoll "[c]ertainly there was 'some evidence" of self defense... that required the
giving of an instruction on the State's burden of proving self-defense beyond a
reasonable doubt", even though the justification evidence conflicted with other testimony
presented. That evidence was the defendant's own testimony. The defendant testified
that, while the victim pulled the defendant's head forward and down, the defendant
"continued to swing the knife at [the victim] until he felt the danger was over." Id., at
212. "An autopsy revealed that the stab wounds in the victim's chest were deep puncture
wounds inflicted from various angles and that the cause of death was multiple stab
wounds, one of which penetrated Wilson's heart and liver and was itself fatal." Id.
Despite the fact that the State's evidence conflicted with the defendant's testimony (i.e.
the victim's wounds were not slashes, as would be expected from the repeated swinging
of a knife, but rather deep punctures), because some evidence of self-defense was
presented upon which a reasonable basis for the justification could be found, the trial
court was required to give the instruction "on the State's burden of proving self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt" and let the jury decide the merits. Id., at 215.
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980), the defendant was convicted of
capital murder and appealed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the law of selfdefense. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265. The day of the killing the defendant was awaiting a
trial for second-degree murder in another case and two of his friends had been
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subpoenaed to testify at that trial.

The defendant went with one of the would-be

witnesses and eventual victim to a house trailer in the wilderness where the other wouldbe witness was already hiding out so as not to be forced to testify. Brown, 607 P.2d at
262-63. Testimony at trial showed that the defendant grabbed a gun from a glove box
and chased the victim around the trailer firing a total of five shots. Brown at 263. One
witness heard the victim say, "Don't, Paul, don't" to the defendant as they ran around the
trailer. Id., at 263. The defendant and some friends then dug a grave and buried the
victim. Id. The medical examiner testified the victim had been shot three times, once in
the thumb, once in the back, and once through the temple. Id., at 263.
The defendant testified that he went into the trailer and saw the victim pickup a
club and was afraid the victim was going to hurt him. Id. at 264. He said that he had
picked up the gun to defend himself, that "when he accosted [the victim] with the weapon
[the victim] took a step toward him but he did not raise the club..." Id., at 264. The
defendant then said he blacked out until he was standing over the dead victim with a gun.
Id.
This Court ruled that the lower court properly refused the self-defense instruction
because there had been no evidence that the victim had threatened the defendant and "no
credible evidence that defendant might have been justified in using deadly force to
protect himself or that he reasonably believed himself to be in danger." Id. at 266. The
Court found "the evidence unmistakably show[ed] instead that defendant was the
aggressor." Id., at 266.
In State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 619 (Utah 1969), the defendant was convicted
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of assault with a deadly weapon and he appealed claiming the trial court erred "by its
refusal to instruct the jury as to his theory of the case." Defendant went to the house of
his ex-wife armed with a knife, "which he claimed he had brought to defend himself,
since he feared that [the ex-wife's brother] would have a stick" since he had seen "the
stick under a couch cushion on a previous visit." Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 619. The exwife and her brother testified that as they tried to leave the defendant pulled out the knife
and started toward the brother so the ex-wife "interceded and grabbed the knife."
Castillo, at 619. They testified the defendant then retrieved the knife and stabbed the exwife. She then fled while the brother and the defendant struggled with the stick and the
knife. Id. The brother was stabbed and the defendant sustained some wounds. Id.
Defendant testified that he recalled being hit from behind, knocking him to the
floor, and then the brother came at him with the knife. Id. "Defendant had no further
recollection of the ensuing moments; he merely remembered that he regained possession
of the knife and was in a position on top of Santana, who was pleading with defendant
not to hurt him any more." Id. In finding the defendant did not present "substantial
evidence in support of his theory" of self-defense this Court emphasized that although the
defendant had argued for a theory of self-defense he did not actually present any evidence
to support the theory. "He claims that he has absolutely no recollection of his victim
being stabbed but merely hypothesizes that apparently she sustained wounds to two
diverse parts of her body while he was legitimately exercising his right of self-defense."
Id., at 620. "While the theory of counsel, persistently and strenuously urged, was that of
self-defense, it was nevertheless all theory and no evidence, all shadow and no
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substance." Id., at 621.
In State v. Spiders, 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315, the defendant was charged with
first degree murder after he shot the victim three times. There were no eyewitnesses to
the shooting but two witnesses in the house at the time of the shooting "testified that they
heard Defendant and [the victim] arguing, followed by a series of gunshots." Spillers,
2007 UT 13, % 4. Defendant testified that he and the victim were arguing and the victim
retrieved a gun from the couch and began threatening him with it making the defendant
nervous. Spillers, at ^f 3. Defendant testified the victim them struck him in the head with
the gun making him feel "cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared. Id. When the victim
approached again the defendant "with his arm cocked to strike again", defendant "pulled
a gun from his waistband and shot [the victim] in the chest." Id.

The defendant

requested an instruction for imperfect legal justification manslaughter but the district
court found "that the evidence presented at trial did not warrant a jury instruction" on that
theory. Id., at f 9. The jury was instructed on perfect self-defense. Id., at f 23.
The defendant appealed that denial and the Utah Court of Appeals reversed. This
Court accepted the State's petition for review on certiorari and upheld the court of
appeals' reversal. The relevant question this Court considered was "whether there [was]
a rational basis to acquit Defendant of murder and convict him of manslaughter" based on
the imperfect legal justification. Id., at f 12. In referring to the evidence supporting the
perfect self-defense claim this Court found that "that the evidence could also be
interpreted by a jury that Defendant was entitled to defend himself against Jackson, but
not entitled to use deadly force when Jackson only struck Defendant with his gun." Id.,
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at ^f 23. Just as with regular self-defense, because there is a version of the facts presented
upon which the theory could be based the trial court should have given the lesser
included on imperfect justification.
In State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, | 1, 18 P.3d 1123, the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter for a shooting at a club. Garcia is another case where the jury
was instructed on self-defense making it a different appeal than this case, but the holding
contains relevant language and reasoning. At trial the State presented evidence that the
defendant was the aggressor and in response the defendant argued he acted in selfdefense. The jury was instructed on self-defense but the instruction failed to specify the
burden of proof. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, Tf 5. The defendant appealed that failure and
on appeal the State argued that the defendant was not entitled to jury instructions on selfdefense as a matter of law, so any deficiency as to the burden in the instruction was
harmless. Garcia, at f 8. The State claimed that evidence showed the defendant was the
aggressor and as such was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. But the court of
appeals disagreed and found that even where the evidence showed the defendant may
have been the aggressor, the jury should still be instructed on self-defense leaving the
factual conclusion to the jury. Id., at ^f 9.
In Garcia the defendant entered a nightclub airmed with a handgun and observed
the victim allegedly assaulting one of the defendant's friends. Id., at f 2. The defendant
approached the victim and a verbal and physical altercation ensued, but it ended when the
defendant pulled the gun from his waistband. Id. The victim backed off at the sight of the
weapon and the defendant returned the gun to his pants. The defendant then testified he
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thought he saw the victim reach to his waist for a gun so the defendant again pulled his
gun, this time firing and killing the victim. Id. In upholding the self-defense claim the
court noted "[e]ven when the possibility that the defendant was the aggressor is evident
during trial, the defendant is still entitled to self-defense instructions" and the jury should
be given the law on self-defense and be allowed to decide whether or not it apples. Id., at

19.
In another case, State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980), the defendant was
convicted of theft of clothing where he and a partner tried to conceal clothing inside an
overcoat. When the two realized store employees were watching them they dropped the
merchandise and tried to escape. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1212. At trial the defendant
requested a jury instruction on the theory of termination of criminal conduct, which
requires a showing that the termination is voluntary and occurs prior to commission of
the offense. Eagle, 611 P.2d at 1213. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court's
refusal of the instruction noting that dropping the items after being detected was neither a
voluntary act, nor did it occur before he took possession of the goods with the purpose of
depriving the owner thereof. Id. The important fact there was that, even if believed, the
defendant's evidence (dropping the items and leaving) would not support a reasonable
doubt that he had not committed the offense because the supposed termination occurred
after the offense had been completed. Based on the evidence, the theft was completed
prior to the alleged termination making the defense useless. Thus, the evidence presented
did not create any reasonable basis to support the defense and the defendant was not
entitled to the instruction.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

Case in other jurisdictions In several jurisdictions with self-defense laws similar to Utah's, when a defendant
seeks to instruct the jury on self defense or defense of a third person the trial court must
view the evidence supporting the theory in the light most favorable to the defendant when
it considers whether or not the instruction is required; and, the court should resolve
questions of fact in favor of the defendant even when the evidence supporting the defense
is weak or controverted. See State v. Solomon, 930 A.2d 716, 721 (Conn. App. 2007) ("A
defendant who asserts a self-defense claim for which there is evidence produced at trial to
justify the instruction is entitled to a self-defense instruction, no matter how weak or
incredible the claim."); State v. Sullivan, 695 A.2d 115, 117 (Maine 1997) (when
considering a self-defense jury instruction "[t]he court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the defendant."); Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E. 951, 955 (Mass.
1998) ("a self-defense instruction must be given... only if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant, permits at least a reasonable doubt that the
defendant reasonably and actually believed that he was in imminent danger..."); State v.
Zumwalt, 973 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Mo. App. 1998) ("In deciding this question [whether or
not to instruction the jury on self-defense], trial courts must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the accused."); Hudson v. State, 956 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. App. 1997)
("When properly requested, a defendant is entitled to a charge on every defensive theory
raised by the evidence, regardless of the strength of the evidence or whether it is
controverted. If the testimony or other evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to
the accused, does not establish a case of self-defense, an instruction is not required.");
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Render v. State, 347 S.W.3d 905, 922 (Tex. App. 2011) ("A defendant is entitled to an
instruction on self-defense if the issue is raised by the evidence regardless of whether that
evidence is strong, weak, unimpeached, or contradicted and regardless of what the trial
court may think about the credibility of the defense. However, if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish self-defense, the defendant is
not entitled to an instruction on the issue."); People v. Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646 (111. 1997)
(where there is some evidence to support an affirmative defense instruction, the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury constitutes an abuse of discretion even if the evidence is
conflicting; even very slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving
of an instruction.).
Berriel could not find any Utah cases on this precise point but would point to State
v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah 1983), where when considering whether a defendant is
entitled to a lesser included offense jury instruction the court views "the evidence and the
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense." Berriel
suggests that this Court should explicitly endorse this view in the context of a request for
a justification instruction in light of this state's strong attitude toward protecting a
defendant's due process rights and the similarity between the request for a lesser included
instruction and the request for a justification instruction.
In State v. Solomon the police responded to a call that the defendant and his wife
were fighting, when the police arrived they found the wife with fresh scratches on her
neck. Solomon, 930 A.2d 716, 719. At trial the wife testified that dinner was being
prepared and the smoke detector sounded so she opened the door to ventilate the smoke,
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which started an argument. She testified the fight escalated when she tried to leave the
apartment and the defendant blocked her exit, prevented her from calling the police, and
grabbed her by the throat, causing the scratches. Solomon, 930 A.2d 716, 720. The
defendant testified that the fight occurred before the smoke alarm and that the fight was
started by the wife, who was intoxicated. He claimed the fight became physical when the
wife threw a bottle of wine at him, swung a chair leg at him, and struck him repeatedly
and asked him to leave. Id.

He refused and then they addressed the smoke alarm. He

testified he never struck her or scratched her. Id.
At trial the defendant did not request a jury instruction on self-defense so on
appeal his claim was that the trial court should have charged the jury on self-defense sua
sponte "because there was evidence adduced at trial to support such a charge." Id., at
720-21. The Connecticut Court of Appeals rejected that claim because the defense was
not requested at trial and, because it was not a constitutional claim, the appellate court
would not review it. Id., at 721. However, the court did note that "[a] defendant who
asserts a self-defense claim for which there is evidence produced at trial to justify the
instruction is entitled to a self-defense instruction, no matter how weak or incredible the
claim." Id. Even though his claim was incredible, due to the physical evidence observed
by the police, the defendant produced some evidence of self-defense and was thus
entitled to an instruction if he had requested it.
In Sullivan the defendant, a war veteran suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder, and his wife went to a bar to confront someone about an earlier incident. That
person saw the wife and immediately pushed the wife back towards the door. The
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defendant was then pushed down and when he saw "'a whole bunch of people' coming
toward him from the dance hall5"7 so he "pulled out a gun and fired into the crowd,
injuring three people." Sullivan, 695 A.2d 115, 116. He testified at trial that he was
scared because there was a large group of people and he believed they were hostile.
Sullivan, at 116. At trial he was denied a requested a self-defense jury instruction and
was found guilty on three counts of aggravated assault. Id., at 117. On appeal he claimed
the trial court should have granted his requested instruction; he claimed defense of
another was in issue because the evidence was "sufficient to make the existence of all the
facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain", as
required by statute. Id.
Maine's Supreme Court agreed with the defendant because, "[v]iewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Sullivan, we conclude that a jury rationally could
entertain a reasonable doubt on the issues of whether Sullivan was the initial aggressor
and whether he knew that he and his wife could have safely retreated from the
encounter." Id., at 119. The court found that after the defendant fell to the ground he was
"not precluded from claiming self-defense if he did not know that his wife could safely
retreat." Id. Even though, at the point he was on the ground all he had seen was his wife
had been shoved and a crowd of people were coming toward him, "[bjecause the
evidence adduced at trial is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it was for the jury
to decide whether Sullivan was the initial aggressor and whether he knew that he and his
wife could have retreated from the encounter in complete safety." Id. The court noted
"[undoubtedly, the evidence in this case is such that a jury could also conclude that
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Sullivan's honestly held beliefs regarding the use of and need for deadly force were
objectively unreasonable" but "[s]uch a possibility, however, is not fatal to Sullivan's
claim of self-defense" nor his requested instruction. Id., at 118.
In Hudson the defendant had been convicted of aggravated assault against a
correctional officer for fighting with a guard who had entered his cell. The evidence at
trial showed that the officer handcuffed the defendant through the door to the cell in
preparation for a shower. The defendant somehow got his hands in front of him and hit
the guard in the face when the door opened, and then pulled the guard into the cell.
Hudson v. State, 956 S.W.2d 103, 104. Eventually the defendant was subdued and both
he and the guard were taken to the prison clinic where defendant was treated for more
serious injuries than those suffered by the guard. Hudson, 956 S.W.2d 103, 104. At trial
the trial court refused to instruct the jury on self-defense and that denial was raised on
appeal. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, while noting that "[w]hen
properly requested, a defendant is entitled to a charge on every defensive theory raised by
the evidence, regardless of the strength of the evidence or whether it is controverted",
because defendant offered no evidence of his state of mind necessary to raise the selfdefense issue. Hudson, at 104-05. There was no evidence that defendant was afraid of the
victim, or that he reasonably believed he was in danger. "There is no evidence that [the
victim], by either words or acts, caused Appellant to reasonably believe force was
immediately necessary to defend himself so the self-defense theory was not raised by
any evidence and the defendant was not entitled to an instruction. Id. The self-defense
theory requires more than the assertion that the conduct was done is self-defense, it
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requires evidence that could possibly support the elements of self-defense. Because the
defendant presented no such evidence, an instruction on the theory was not required.
In Jones the defendant was charged with attempted aggravated criminal sexual
abuse after he was alleged to have disrobed in the presence of a 16 year old and solicited
a sexual act. At trial the victim testified to the sequence of events and then the defense
called an officer, who had interviewed the victim, who testified that the victim had
described the events differently. Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646, 6470-48. However, both stories
from the victim would have constituted the elements of the offense.

The defendant

requested the jury be instructed on the affirmative defense wherein he would be acquitted
if he reasonably believed the victim to be 17 years of age or older. The trial court denied
the requested instruction and the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed stating that the record
did not contain evidence that "raised the issue of the affirmative defense so as to require
the trial judge to instruct the jury in this regard." Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646, 648 {citing
People v. Jones, 276 111. App.3d 1006, 1009). But the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
because "[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is
some foundation for the instruction in the evidence" and even "[v]ery slight evidence
upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction." Jones, 676 N.E.2d
646, 649 (internal citations omitted). The supreme court continued, citing the dissent in
the court of appeals decision, c"[i]n deciding whether to instruct on a certain theory, the
court's role is to determine whether there is some evidence supporting that theory; it is
not the court's role to weigh the evidence.'" Id.
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The evidence the Illinois Supreme Court found to be sufficient to raise the
affirmative defense was as follows: at the time of the offense the victim was 16 years and
10 months old (it is not clear how that evidence was presented to the jury), the defendant
did not know the victim prior to the incident, the victim was consuming alcohol at the
time of the event, the victim was apparently free to stay the night at his friend's
apartment, and the jury saw the victim testify "and was able to observe his appearance
and demeanor so as to determine whether there was a reasonable doubt that defendant
believed [the victim] to be 17 years old." Jones, at 649. It doesn't appear that the
defendant testified he believed the victim was at least 17 years old. The court concluded,
"[ultimately, it was for the jury to determine whether defendant had a reasonable belief
that the victim had attained the age of 17 years. Absent defendant's tendered instruction,
the jury lacked the necessary tools to analyze the evidence fully and to reach a verdict
based on those facts." Id., at 650.
Several key rules can be taken from these cases. First, a defendant is entitled to an
instruction upon his theory of the case, including justification defenses, when some
evidence has been presented, either by the State or the defense, to the jury that would
support a reasonable basis upon which the theory could be based. Second, the court need
not be convinced of the validity of the defense in order to instruct jury on it. The court
should not weigh the evidence or assess its credibility in its decision whether or not to
instruct the jury on the theory. Finally, when considering whether or not there is some
evidence to support the theory, the court should view the evidence presented in the light
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most favorable to the defendant and the requirements for the inclusion of the instruction
should be construed liberally.
Application
It appears the error the majority of the court of appeals made was that it decided,
taking all the evidence together, that the threat to the third person was not imminent, and
that therefore, Berriel was not entitled to the jury instruction on the theory that his action
was justified to protect Rachel. The majority concluded, "under the circumstances at the
time he assaulted Luis with a knife, a jury could not reasonably have concluded that the
nature or immediacy of the danger to Rachel reasonably justified a belief that it was
probable that Luis was about to use 'unlawful force' against her." Berriel, at f 6. The
decision therefore that that evidence presented could not have justified a reasonable belief
that Rachel was in danger of an imminent threat. The question for this Court to decide is
whether there was a reasonable basis upon which the jury could have found a reasonable
doubt that Berriel did not act in defense of a third person, given the evidence presented at
trial, considered in the light most favorable to Berriel.
The majority of the court of appeals cites the Second Circuit case of Harris v.
Scully, as an example of a defense of a third person claim where an instruction was not
necessary because the jury could not have reasonably found that the victim posed a
present or imminent threat to the third person. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, f 5. However,
the facts in Harris are distinguishable from the facts in this case and the distinctions
between the two cases actually demonstrate why the defense instruction should have been
given in this case. In Harris the defendant was convicted of killing his brother and on
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appeal he claimed "that the jury should have been permitted to determine whether he
reasonably believed that... his mother and his brother, Alonzo, were in danger from [his
brother] John's imminent use of deadly physical force." Harris v. Scully, 779 F.2d 875,
878. On the afternoon of the killing the victim, John, was intoxicated and began arguing
with his mother, he threw her on the bed, refused to leave, and tore the phone from the
wall. Harris, 779 P.2d 875, 877. The defendant heard the dispute and tried to intervene
by calling the police. When the police arrived they refused to arrest the victim, but they
did order him to leave. The victim soon returned and began fighting with the defendant
and his brother, Alonzo, which ultimately resulted in the defendant stabbing and killing
the victim. On appeal the court found that there was no version of the events that would
show "at the time of the killing, John [the victim] was using or was about to use deadly
physical force against any other family member" and thus the defense of others was not
supported. Id., at 879.
The facts in this case are quite different. Here the factors supporting a finding of
imminence were present from Berriel's perspective at the time he acted to defend Rachel.
He knew about Luis' violent character and his history of violence toward Rachel, and she
had called for help, when Berriel encountered Rachel she was still in Luis' presence and
Luis told Berriel to "stay out of it", and then confrontation immediately occurred.
Nothing that would have led Berriel to believe Rachel was no longer in imminent danger
came between the call for help and the use of force. In contrast, in Harris the victim
fought with the mother then left, then showed up again and fought with the brother
Alonzo, which ended, and then fought with the defendant. Then, after the fighting with
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the defendant for some time the defendant began stabbing the victim. The stabbing was
the use of force the defendant claimed was justified, not the fighting. The record
"indicates that at the time of the stabbing [the defendant] alone was struggling with
John..." Id. In other words, at the time the defendant used the force he sought to justify
he already knew the third person was not in danger because he had already come between
the victim and the third person. Here the record indicates that the threat to Rachel's
safety was not separated from the use of force by anything that would let Berriel
reasonably believe that she was no longer in danger of imminent harm. Unlike Harris
where the defendant knew third persons were no longer in danger because the use of
force (the stabbing) was done only after the victim had been separated from the third
persons and the fight was only between the defendant and the victim.
The majority also cited the Kansas case of State v. Hernandez, which is clearly
distinguishable from the facts in this case as well and again illustrate why the court of
appeals and the trial court in this case were wrong. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317, ^f 5. In
Hernandez the defendant had been made aware of threats and threatening behavior of the
victim toward the defendant's sister. Each of them, the sister, the victim and the
defendant, worked at the same location. Evidence showed the defendant was aware of a
threat the victim had made to kill the sister at 11:00. On the morning of the shooting the
defendant armed himself with a gun, approached the victim, "and invited him outside to
talk." Hernandez, 861 P.2d 814, 817. The defendant confronted the victim about a
domestic situation with his sister (the victim's estranged wife) and they began arguing.
Id.

The defendant testified he pulled out a gun after the victim leaned toward the
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defendant and shot the victim " c to stop him, slow him down... I thought maybe he was
gonna take me down and them go in after my sister."' Id. After the first shot the victim
said "'Now, I'm gonna kill you too,'" which the defendant said he interpreted as a threat
against himself and his sister. Id., at 818. The second, third and fourth shots were fired
because the victim began to run and the defendant said he believed the victim was going
into the building after his sister. Id.5
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on
defense of another after it examined two questions: "[d]id Hernandez sincerely believe it
was necessary to kill [the victim] in order to defend [the sister]" and "[w]as his belief
reasonable?" Id., at 819. The defendant argued that his actions were in response to an
imminent threat because the victim had threatened to kill his sister. However, the court
found that the term imminent must have some limit and the court found that the threat, to
kill her at 11:00 a.m., given the fact that she was not present at the time of the shooting,
did not create an imminent danger. Id., at 820.
The circumstances presented to the trial court in this case are clearly different.
Although the defendant in Hernandez was made aware of other prior acts of threats and
violence similar to information Berriel was aware of the significant difference between
these cases are what immediately led to the confrontation and what the circumstances
were at the time force was used. In Hernandez the defendant had been preparing to

There is no evidence in the opinion whether or not evidence was presented as to the
location of the sister at the time of the shooting, other than to say she was not at the
scene.
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confront the victim for days and weeks before the incident, he warned others of his intent
to harm the victim, he showed others the gun, and on the day of the shooting he calmly
asked the victim to talk, knowing fully that the sister was not in the area. Hernandez, at
816-17. In this case the evidence showed Rachel called Berriel 'shortly' before the
incident, she is crying and asking for help, and Berriel immediately begins trying to find
them to protect her. As soon as Berriel finds Rachel, he discovers she is in Luis' presence
and the confrontation occurs before anything changes his understanding of the threat.
Unlike Hernandez, here there is no prior planning, there is no calm attempt to talk,
and Rachel was in the presence of Luis from the time of the call until the time of the
confrontation. Although the majority believes that the time between the call and the
confrontation made the threat less than imminent, there is nothing that Berriel was aware
of that lessened the imminence of the threat to Rachel. See Berriel, fn. 2 (Thorne,
dissent). As pointed out by Judge Thorne in dissent, "once Berriel had a reasonable basis
to believe that Rachel was in imminent danger... his actions in her defense were
potentially justifiable... until such time as Berriel had reason to believe that the danger to
Rachel had passed. Berriel, 2011 UT App 317 ,^| 23. Because Berriel acted immediately
to protect Rachel after she called crying for help, because the use of force came shortly
after the call, and because Rachel was still in Luis's presence when Berriel found them
and Luis made it known that he did not want Berriel to intervene, the facts in this case are
clearly distinguishable from those in Hernandez and those distinctions demonstrate why
the defense of a third party should have been allowed in this case.
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The majority opinion also cites State v. Brown as an example of an appropriately
denied request for a self-defense instruction. Berriel, at % 5. But the facts in this case are
also distinguishable from those in Brown as well. In Brown the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder for killing a man who was set to testify as a witness against the
defendant in an unrelated murder case. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 262.

On appeal the

defendant claimed the trial court "erred in refusing to give [self defense] instructions."
Brown, at 265. The evidence presented at trial in support of self-defense was as follows.
The defendant had taken the victim to a trailer in a wilderness area to hide until the trial
was over. Id., at 262. The defendant testified "he was inside the trailer when he saw [the
victim] pick up a club." Id., at 266. He said he was apprehensive that the victim would
try to harm him. Id., at 264. The defendant then testified that the victim did not say
anything but that he went out and shot at the victim who then began to run away. Id., at
266.

The Utah Supreme Court found there was "no evidence capable of raising a

reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to whether the defendant acted in self defense" and
that the instructions on self defense were properly refused. Id. Rather "the evidence
unmistakably shows instead that defendant was the aggressor." Id.
Unlike the facts in Brown, where the defendant did not present any facts of
imminence or reasonableness upon which the jury could have considered the justification,
here Berriel did present such evidence. In Brown at the moment when the victim was
observed with the club (the moment the defendant became aware of the possible threat)
the victim was outside the trailer and the defendant was not in danger, and there was not
any evidence presented a threat prior to that moment.

Furthermore, the defendant
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testified that the victim did not threaten to use the club even while he was holding it.
There was nothing in evidence to support the theory that the defendant reasonably
believed he needed to protect himself, only that the victim picked up a stick and it made
the defendant apprehensive.

Here, according to the evidence, Luis was not only

threatening to harm Rachel but was in fact abusing her while she was calling.6 When
Berriel received the phone call he believed Rachel was in Luis' presence and continued to
be in his presence up until the time Berriel confronted Luis.

In Brown when the

defendant approached the victim, supposedly to defend himself, the victim turned and ran
only to be shot in the back as he tried to escape. Here, when Berriel confronted Luis to
defend Rachel, Luis told Berriel "You don't know what's going on, stay out of it" and
continued toward Berriel. R. 144: 266. This statement gave Berriel further reason to
believe that something was still going on, the very thing for which Rachel had very
recently been crying for help, and Luis' movements toward Berriel prevented him from
finding out any more information. The majority's reference to Brown is unpersuasive
because the facts are so very different. There the defendant's conduct in no conceivable
way supported a self-defense claim.

Yet here, while perhaps not conclusive of

imminence, the facts at least support a reasonable basis upon which a jury could have
found a reasonable doubt in the State's duty to prove that the threat was not imminent.
There was clearly "some evidence" of the defense of another and Berriel should have
been allowed to instruct the jury. State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 215 (Utah 1985).

6

Scott Carlisle testified Rachel's screams on the phone made him think she was being hit
right then.
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Just like Garcia and Knoll where the evidence of the justification defense
conflicted with the other evidence, there was certainly some evidence presented to
support the justification defense and because of that the court is obligated by the statute
and by the due process clause to allow the defendant to present his theory to the jury.
Unlike Castillo and Brown where the defendants testified they did not recall the events
surrounding their use of force and yet requested a self-defense instruction, Berriel's
theory here clearly demonstrates the belief he had that confronting Luis with force was
necessary. Evidence was presented that Luis had repeatedly abused Rachel, that she had
repeatedly sought help and that just before the confrontation she again called Berriel
frantically pleading for him to intercede. Berriel was not asking the jury to invent the
circumstance that would justify his conduct; he was asking the jury to consider whether
the circumstances presented justified his conduct.
The court of appeals' holding accepts the fact that at the time the phone call was
made there was some evidence that Berriel had reason to believe Rachel was under an
imminent threat of harm. Berriel, at ^| 6 ("there was some evidence that Berriel had
information that led him to believe Luis had been violent toward Rachel in the past, even
the very recent past..."). The crucial fact to the majority was that "at least fifteen
minutes had passed from the time of her call and there was no evidence that Rachel was
in imminent danger at the time Berriel attacked Luis." Berriel, at f 5. However, as
pointed out by Judge Thome's dissent, this fifteen minutes is presumed by the majority
based on other testimony, but is certainly not required by the evidence. In a footnote the
majority claims that Luis "testified that the only phone available to Rachel was their
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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home phone. We therefore can infer that at least fifteen minutes passed between the
phone call and the altercation. We have no information, however, as to precisely how
much time had passed." Berriel, at fn. 2.
It seems the majority relied upon Luis' testimony in answer to the question from
defense counsel "Does Rachel have a phone?" to which the witness replied, "House
phone." R. 143: 117. Presumably the majority the court of appeals is interpreting the
witness's answer to mean 'she only has a house phone and not a cell phone and she does
not have access to any cell phones'; however, that much meaning is not conveyed by the
question or the answer. Rather, in context, it seems likely that Luis actually believed
defense counsel's question was referring specifically to the house phone because a
significant portion of his testimony, and the questions just prior to this question, were
aimed directly at other prior phone calls that were clearly made to the house phone.
Petitioner can find no other evidence on the record supporting the majority's conclusion
that Rachel had no access to a cell phone or that the distressed phone call necessarily
came from the home phone prior to the trip to pick up her brother, and that therefore the
call necessarily took place "at least fifteen minutes" prior to the confrontation. Berriel, at
f 5; see R. 143: 89 (Luis's testimony about the earlier calls from Berriel to the house
phone); R. 143: 91-92 (same); R. 143: 95 (same); R. 143: 98 (same); R. 143: 117 (same).
The majority was right about one thing, there was no information as to precisely
how much time passed from the phone call to the confrontation, however, evidence was
presented to show that it was not a long time. Judge Thorne seemed to agree with this
position in his dissent when he noted that "Rachel did not testify as to exactly when or
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from where she called Berriel, and in the absence of clear testimony as to the timing of
the phone call, I believe that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the interval
may well have been somewhat less than fifteen minutes." Berriel, at fn. 2 (Thorne,
dissent). As noted in Judge Thome's dissent, based on the evidence in the record and the
nearly universality of cellular telephones, the majority's conclusion that the call must
have been from the home phone and therefore must have been at least fifteen minutes
before the confrontation is not reasonable.
Furthermore, even assuming the call took place from the house phone prior to Luis
and Rachel leaving, although Rachel's testimony was that the trip took about 15 minutes,
other witnesses testified that Berriel left for Rachel's house immediately after the call
ended. Isaac testified that Rachel called and "was crying 'cause her boyfriend was hitting
her..." so when Berriel got the call, he turned the car around and drove the other way. R.
144: 249. Scott saw Rachel's name on the caller ID of Berriel's phone, he said when
Berriel was done with the call Berriel said "[h]e was going down to this girl's house
'cause she was getting beat up..." so the next thing was they "went over there." R. 144:
255-56. She was "screaming and crying on the phone" so that's when they "turned and
went to her house." R. 144: 260. Rachel herself testified that she "really didn't know"
how far of a drive it was (R. 143: 139) and that she didn't have a good memory about the
events (R. 143: 203). Luis' statement at the time he exited the car also established that he
knew what it was about and was not surprised that Berriel showed up to confront him.
With all this testimony the jury could have reasonably believed that the interval
between the call and the confrontation was a very short time. The majority's strict
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adherence to fifteen minutes is neither required by the evidence nor consistent with the
principle that the facts should be considered in the light most favorable to the defense.
Finally, even if this Court feels constrained by the record to find that the call for
help was at least fifteen minutes prior to the confrontation, which Berriel believes is not
warranted, there is still no need to find as the court of appeals did that there was no
reasonable basis to support the defense of a third person instruction. The State has
argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that if Berriel were allowed to have his
instruction where he used force at any time other than a moment when Rachel was being
abused, then instances of retaliation (Appellee's Brief at 28) and vigilantism would gain
the protection of law {Berriel, at \ 6). The majority and the State seem to suggest that if
the call for help and the use of force were separated by 15 minutes then the use offeree is
necessarily retaliation rather than protection and a defendant must not be allowed to
present such a theory, but this supposed threat to the statute is unfounded. The jury is
still required to find the defendant "reasonably believes that the force is necessary to
defend... a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force." UTAH
CODE

§ 76-2-402(1). The jury would still have to consider the reasonableness and

imminence based on the evidence and the factors set forth in subsection (5). The State
seems to suggest that the jury would not be able to consider whether or not the threat was
imminent if the facts do not clearly show that the harm to the third person was occurring
immediately as the decision to use force is made. That position is incorrect.
Judge Thome's dissent makes this flaw manifest. He wrote "[i]n my view, once
Berriel had a reasonable basis to believe that Rachel was in imminent danger due to her
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phone call, his actions in her defense were potentially justifiable under Utah Code section
76-2-402 until such time as Berriel had reason to believe that the danger to Rachel had
passed." Berriel, % 23 (Thorne, dissent). Thorne acknowledged that at some point "the
mere passage of time could... give reason to infer that a particular threat has ended.
However, the potentially quite short period of time between Rachel's phone call and the
ultimate altercation in this case does not give rise to such an inference." Berriel, fh. 3
(Thorne, dissent). This point is critical here, unlike Hernandez where the defendant
planned the use of force for weeks, separated the victim from the third person, began by
calmly discussing the matter and then decided to shoot victim outside the third person's
presence; here we are talking about a matter of minutes and Rachel is in Luis' presence
the entire time, and from Berriel's perspective, nothing has changed when he confronts
Luis.
While it is true, the jury could have looked at the facts emphasized by the court of
appeals, the fact that Luis was not apparently harming or threatening Rachel at the
moment Luis exited the vehicle and ran toward Berriel, and found the threat was not
imminent. The jury could have found based on the evidence that the interval was at least
15 minutes and believed 15 minutes makes the threat no longer imminent, or the jury
could have believed that there never was a threat or a phone call for help and the
confrontation stemmed from the earlier disagreements between Berriel and Luis.
However, the jury could also have focused on the facts presented by the defense, that
Rachel repeatedly lied in order to cover for Luis' violence, that she was hysterical on the
phone within minutes of the confrontation, that at the time of the confrontation Luis
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seemed to try to prevent Berriel from finding out what was "going on", and the jury could
have found the threat was ongoing and Berriel5s conduct was reasonable to defend
Rachel. That is the very point of the statute, the trier of fact should consider the facts and
decide about imminence and reasonableness. The very fact that this weighing of facts
can take place is the exact reason the issue should have gone to the jury. The simple truth
is that the jury heard evidence upon which it could have found the conduct was justified
(or at least a reasonable doubt in the State's burden to show it was not justified) and
therefore both the trial court and the majority of the court of appeals erred in concluding
otherwise.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, the decision of the majority of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on defense of a third person was an error
because there was some evidence presented to support the defense theory. It is not
unreasonable that the jury, based on the evidence, could have found a reasonable doubt
that Berriel's conduct was not justified. Because of that possibility, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals committed error and this Court should conclude "Berriel was entitled to
his requested instruction on the defense of others" and should vacate the conviction and
remand this case for a new trial. Berriel, at f 28 (Thorne, dissent).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2\ST

day of
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2012.

Dougla^J. Thompson
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76-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined.
(1) (a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that force or a threat of force
is necessary to defend the person or a third person against another person's
imminent use of unlawful force.
(b) A person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if the person reasonably believes that force is necessary
to prevent death or serious bodily injury to the person or a third person as a result
of another person's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission
of a forcible felony.
(2) (a) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if the person:
(i) initially provokes the use offeree against the person with the intent to use
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant;
(ii) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or
attempted commission of a felony; or
(iii) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless the
person withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other
person his intent to do so and, notwithstanding, the other person continues or
threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (2)(a)(iii) the following do not, by themselves,
constitute "combat by agreement":
(i) voluntarily entering into or remaining in an ongoing relationship; or
(ii) entering or remaining in a place where one has a legal right to be.
(3) A person does not have a duty to retreat from the force or threatened force
described in Subsection (1) in a place where that person has lawfully entered or
remained, except as provided in Subsection (2)(a)(iii).
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated
assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, rape of a child, object rape, object
rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, and
aggravated sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the
Person, and arson, robbery, and burglary as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6,
Offenses Against Property.
(b) Any other felony offense which involves the use of force or violence
against a person so as to create a substantial danger of death or serious bodily
injury also constitutes a forcible felony.
(c) Burglary of a vehicle, defined in Section 76-6-204, does not constitute a
forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful entry is
made or attempted.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier
of fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
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(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious
bodily injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.
Amended by Chapter 324, 2010 General Session
Amended by Chapter 361, 2010 General Session
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as
defined in Section 76-5-102 and uses:
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under
Subsection (2)(b).
(b) A violation of Subsection (1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second
degree felony.
Amended by Chapter 193, 2010 General Session

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(tW""~ " \

FILED
F! L F rrT
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

2012 JAN 19 AH 10: 20
IN THE UTAH C O U R T S M P g M ^ j

cni:,

SEP t 5 2011

,-

PR0V0
—ooOoo—

State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20090665-CA
FILED
(September 15, 2011)

v.
Darren BerrieL

| 2011 UTApp 317 |
Defendant and Appellant.

Fourth District, Provo Department, 081402953
The Honorable Gary D. Stott
Attorneys:

Margaret P. Lindsay and Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Thorne, and Roth.
ROTH, Judge:
11
Darren Berriel appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b), (3) (2008) (current version at id. § 76-5103(l)(a), (2)(a) (Supp. 2011)), and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault,
a class A misdemeanor, see id. § 76-10-507 (2008). First, he argues that the trial court
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on justification for the use of force in defense of
another as a defense to the aggravated assault charge. Second, he contends that the trial
court erroneously denied his motion to merge the weapon possession conviction with
the aggravated assault conviction. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny the
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requested instruction but vacate the conviction for possession of a deadly weapon with
intent to assault.
\2
Berriel was charged with stabbing the victim, Luis, with a knife and with
possession of the knife with the intent to commit the assault. Approximately three
weeks before the incident from which these charges arose, Berriel's friend, Rachel,
confided in him that Luis, her boyfriend, was physically abusing her.1 When Rachel
called Berriel on September 23, 2008, for help, she was screaming and crying that Luis
was beating her. Berriel, who had been driving a group of friends to the movies,
immediately,drove to Rachel and Luis's house. On the way, he called one of Rachel's
friends to have her remove Rachel from the scene. When Berriel arrived, however,
neither Luis nor Rachel were home. Berriel and his friends waited in the car for them to
return.
13
In the meantime, Luis and Rachel had gone to pick up Rachel's younger brother.
Rachel testified that the entire trip took fifteen to twenty minutes.2 When they returned
to the house, Luis was driving, while Rachel was in the passenger seat and her brother
was in the back seat. As the three exited the car, there was no indication of an ongoing
argument, nor did any of them appear to be upset. Berriel immediately ran at Luis with
a knife.3 As Berriel approached, Luis told him, "[Y]ou don't need that knife to fight

1. Rachel testified that she had told Berriel that Luis hits her. Others testified that they
had witnessed other acts of abuse, including Luis pushing Rachel into a car door,
causing her to hit her head and leaving a scar on it, and throwing her across a room. It
is not apparent from the record that Berriel was aware of these acts.
2. Luis testified that the only phone available to Rachel was their home phone. We
therefore can infer that at least fifteen minutes passed between the phone call and the
altercation. We have no information, however, as to precisely how much time had
passed.
3. There was testimony from one witness that Berriel had begun to run toward Luis's
car even before it stopped. Another witness, however, indicated that it was Luis who
actually ran at Berriel. Because of this testimony, the trial court granted Berriel's
request to instruct the jury on self-defense. Except where this conflict is relevant to the
(continued...)
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with me." A brief physical encounter ensued, during which Berriel thrust his knife
toward Luis's stomach. Luis dropped his arms to protect his abdomen, and the knife
caught him in the left forearm. Luis then ran to get his dog from the backyard, and
Berriel and his friends fled. Although Luis pursued Berriel and his friends by car, he
never caught u p with them. Luis later went to the hospital to have his arm stitched.
During the encounter, Rachel was somewhere between fifteen feet and fifteen yards
away from the altercation. 4
^4
BerrieTs first claim of error is that the trial court refused to instruct the jury on
his defense that the attack on Luis was justified by the need to defend another person,
Rachel. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (2008) ("A person is justified in threatening or
using force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent
use of unlawful force/') (current version at id. § 76-2-402(1)(a) (Supp. 2011)). We review
the trial court's denial of a requested jury instruction as a question of law for
correctness. See State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, i 10, 220 P.3d 136. In an analogous
situation, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the circumstances that entitle a defendant
to a jury instruction on self-defense, which is codified., along with defense of another, in
Utah Code section 76-2-402(1) as a justification defense:
"If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict
with the State's proof, be such that the jury may entertain a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-

3. (...continued)
resolution of an issue on appeal, we accept the facts in favor of the jury's verdict. See
generally State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 4 9 , 1 3 , 243 P.3d 1250 ("On appeal, we review the record
facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4. Rachel testified that she was near a light post away from the altercation, though she
did not give a distance. Luis estimated that the light post was fifteen to twenty feet
from him and Berriel. Rachel's friend corroborated that Rachel was not near the
encounter. Rachel's brother testified that he too was near the light post, which he
estimated was fifteen yards from Luis and Berriel. He later clarified that he was no
more than the distance between the witness stand and the podium in the courtroom, a
distance not specified in the record.
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defense, he is entitled to have the jury instructed fully and
clearly on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all
reasonable men must conclude that the evidence is so slight
as to be incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's
mind as to whether a defendant accused of a crime acted in
self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are properly
refused."
State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386,1390 (Utah 1977) (quoting State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70,
457 P.2d 618, 620 (1969)); see also State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 8,18 P.3d 1123
(observing that it is the defendant's burden to "provide some reasonable basis for the
jury to conclude" that the action was justified, though the evidence may be presented
by either the prosecution or the defense (emphasis omitted)).
%5 The trial court decided there was a sufficient basis for a self-defense instruction in
this case because one witness testified that Luis first ran at Berriel. Unlike the selfdefense claim, however, there is no evidence capable of creating a reasonable doubt that
Berriel may have been acting in defense of Rachel.5 According to the undisputed
testimony, when Rachel and Luis arrived at their residence, at least fifteen minutes after
Rachel had called Berriel and told him that Luis was assaulting her, they did not appear
even to be arguing. There was no evidence that Luis, during the time he could have
been observed by Berriel, had threatened, touched, harmed, or even approached Rachel
in any way, nor had he exhibited any weapons. In fact, from the point at which he
emerged from the car, Luis's attention was directed entirely at Berriel, who was coming
at him with a knife.6 Moreover, during Luis's encounter with Berriel, Rachel was at
least fifteen feet away and out of the path of the confrontation. On these facts, a jury

5. Some of the factors that are relevant to whether the threat of unlawful force is
imminent and whether the defendant's actions are reasonable are "the nature of the
danger," "the immediacy of the danger," "the probability that the unlawful force would
result in death or serious bodily injury," "the other's prior violent acts or violent
propensities," and "the patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5) (2008) (current version at id. (Supp. 2011)).
6. While there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether Luis or Berriel was the first
to run toward the other, there was no dispute that Berriel ran toward Luis with a knife
in his hand.
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could not reasonably have concluded that Luis posed a present or imminent threat of
unlawful force to Rachel. See generally Harris v. Scully, 779 F.2d 875, 879 (2d Cir. 1985)
(affirming the denial of an instruction on defense of a third person in a murder trial
because there was no version of the events in which the jury could have believed that
the deceased was about to use deadly force against the defendant's mother or brother
when the deceased had just left the home where the mother was located and the brother
had broken free from the fistfight); State v. Hernandez, 861 P.2d 814, 820 (Kan. 1993)
(upholding the trial court's decision to deny an instruction on defense of another where
the person allegedly defended was not present during the fight that led to the fatal
gunshots because implied threats and a "history of violence [between the deceased and
the third person] could not turn the killing into a situation of imminent danger"); State
v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1980) (affirming the denial of justification instructions
where the only evidence to support the defendant's theory of self-defense was that the
deceased had implicitly threatened him with a club v/hile the defendant was still inside
the house and the deceased remained outside). The fact that Berriel may have believed
that Rachel was in danger when she called because she was screaming and crying for
help and Berriel was aware that Luis had previously physically abused her likewise
does not constitute a sufficient basis for a defense-of-another instruction where at least
fifteen minutes had passed from the time of her call and there was no evidence that
Rachel was in imminent danger at the time Berriel attacked Luis. See State v. Starks, 627
P.2d 88, 91 (Utah 1981) (stating that "[t]he right to [justification defenses] ceases when
the danger has passed or ceases to be imminent").
16
Thus, while there was some evidence that Berriel had information that led him to
believe Luis had been violent toward Rachel in the past, even the very recent past,
under the circumstances at the time he assaulted Luis with a knife, a jury could not
reasonably have concluded that the nature or immediacy of the danger to Rachel
reasonably justified a belief that it was probable that Luis was about to use "unlawful
force" against her. And it is the imminence of harm to another that is central to the
legal justification of violence to prevent it; otherwise, this humane law of justification
could be extended to countenance retribution or vigilantism. See generally Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-402. Therefore, we affirm the trial court'!? decision not to instruct the jury
on defense of another as a justification for Berriel's conduct.

20090665-CA

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

I

"1

\7
We turn now to Berriel's contention that the possession of a deadly weapon with
intent to assault conviction should have merged7 with the aggravated assault
conviction.8 Pursuant to Utah Code section 76-1-402,
[a] defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action
for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under a
single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one provision;
an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (2008). Specifically, "[a] defendant may be convicted of
an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense/' Id. § 76-1-402(3). We review whether a crime is a
lesser included offense of another as a question of law for correctness. See State v.
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, J 9, 71 P.3d 624.
18
To determine whether one offense is included within another, we apply a twophase test. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing State v. Hill,
674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). First, we compare the statutory elements to determine if

7. Although Berriel refers to this claim as a merger issue, he frames the issue as one that
involves both the merger and the lesser included offense doctrines. We agree that,
under the facts presented to the jury in this case, possession of a deadly weapon with
intent to assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and do not address
whether the merger doctrine, as described in a series of kidnaping cases cited by Berriel,
provides a separate basis for reversing the conviction.
8. The State argues that this issue is not preserved because Berriel raised it following
the State's case-in-chief and did not renew it after the jury rendered its verdict.
According to our case law, however, a merger or lesser included offense argument is
preserved if it is raised "at any time, either during trial, or following the conviction on a
motion to vacate." State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, % 7,103 P.3d 153 (internal quotation
marks omitted).

onnonAAt;_r A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

r

>

the lesser offense is proven by the same or less than all the elements required to prove
the greater offense, that is, whether the crimes are "such that the greater cannot be
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser/7 See id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). If either of the crimes have multiple variations, as in this case, we must
also "consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists
between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial/' See id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
19
Two of our prior cases provide useful guidance in applying this test. In State v.
Ross, 951 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the defendant was involved in a forged check
cashing scheme, in which he and a male accomplice would pick up a female accomplice
to whom they would provide false identification and a forged check. See id. at 237-38.
The woman would then cash the check while the men waited in the car; she then
returned the cash to the male accomplice, who divided it between them. See id. During
the three-week scheme, they cashed, in this manner, thirty-five to forty checks, each
worth $300 to $700. See id. The defendant was convicted of forgery and
communications fraud, and he appealed, arguing that the forgery offense was included
within communications fraud. See id. at 237-38, 241 & n.6. To be guilty of
communications fraud, one must "devise[] any scheme or artifice to defraud another" of
"property, money, or [other] thing" worth at least $5000 and must "communicatee
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme or artifice." See id. at 241-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Forgery requires a person to "make[], complete]], execute[], authenticate!], issue[],
transferf], publish]], or utter[]" a "check with a face amount of $100 or more" with the
"purpose to defraud" or "knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud." See id. at 242
(internal quotation marks omitted).
f 10 After comparing the elements, we determined that under at least one variation of
the offenses, forgery was a lesser included offense of communications fraud. See id.
Under that variation, a defendant would have to have devised a scheme that involved
uttering or transferring forged checks of at least $100 and "communicated with another
person for the purpose of executing the [fraudulent] scheme by uttering or transferring
a forged check worth at least $100" with the goal of obtaining at least $5000 total. See id.
We thus considered whether, under the specific variations of the crimes presented and
proven at trial, forgery was an included offense. See id. The State conceded that it had
told the jury that it could find that both a "communication" required for
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communications fraud and an "utterance" required for forgery occurred when the
defendant passed the check to the female accomplice. See id. It argued on appeal,
however, that the conviction could be upheld because there was evidence in the record
from which the jury could have found an independent basis for the communications
fraud conviction. See id. We disagreed, observing that the jury instructions perpetuated
the State's theory that the "communication" and the "utterance" could both be the
passing of the written check because they defined "communication" as including a
writing such as a check. See id. at 245. Moreover, the jury was never asked to find a
"communication" separate from the passing of the check. See id. Without a separate
factual basis for each conviction, we determined that forgery was a lesser included
offense of communications fraud and vacated the forgery conviction. See id.
111 A similar issue arose in State v. Chutes, 2003 UT App 155, 71 P.3d 624, in which
this court considered whether forgery was a lesser included offense of identity fraud.
See id. f 16. We agreed with the parties that some variations of identity fraud included
forgery because the forgery elements of "mak[ing] or executing] a writing purporting
to be an existent person" "with a purpose to defraud" could fall within the scope of the
"us[ing] or attempting] to use [personal] information with fraudulent intent" elements
of identity fraud. See id. f l 16-18 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we
examined the evidence presented at trial to determine if the convictions of each offense
were based on separate factual evidence. See id. 119. At trial, the State did not argue to
the jury that the identity fraud was accomplished by acts different from those necessary
to commit forgery. See id. 123. Nor did the jury instructions explicitly inform the jury
that the forged writings themselves could not also fulfill the "us[ing] or attempting] to
use [personal] information" element of identity fraud. See id. Tl 16, 26. Thus, having
determined that the "the [arguments,] instructions!,] and evidence at trial" did not
inform a reasonable jury that it had to base each conviction on separate evidence, we
vacated the defendant's conviction for forgery as a lesser included offense of identity
fraud. See id. %% 22-23, 27 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Using the approach employed in Ross and Chukes, we now consider whether
Berriel was appropriately convicted of both aggravated assault and possession of a
deadly weapon with an intent to assault. A defendant is guilty of one variation of third
degree aggravated assault if he commits an assault by using a dangerous weapon. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b), (3) (2008) (current version at id. § 76-5-103(l)(a), (2)(a)
(Supp. 2011)). A "[d]angerous weapon" includes "any item capable of causing death or
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serious bodily injury/' a definition that clearly includes most knives. See id. § 76-1601(5)(a) (2008). The defendant must commit such arts intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. See id. § 76-5-103 (specifying no culpable mental state for aggravated
assault); id. § 76-2-102 (providing the culpable mental state for crimes where the
definition of the offense does not specify one). A defendant is guilty of possession of a
deadly weapon with intent to assault, a class A misdemeanor, if he possesses a
dangerous weapon9 with the accompanying "intent to unlawfully assault another." See
id. § 76-10-507. A comparison of the elements of the two crimes reveals that the
possession of a deadly weapon-the knife-which is an element of the weapon possession
charge, can be proven by the same facts as the use of the dangerous weapon required by
the aggravated assault charge because a defendant ordinarily has to possess the weapon
to use it. Additionally, the "intent to unlawfully assault another" element of the
weapon possession charge can be established by the same facts as the aggravated
assault charge if the assault itself was intentional. Thus, we must "consider the
evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific
variations of the crimes actually proved at trial/' See Ross, 951 P.2d at 242 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
113 Although aggravated assault involving the use of a dangerous weapon may be
committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b);
id. § 76-2-102, the State focused its case at trial on evidence that Berriel both intended to
assault Luis and intentionally did so. In particular, the State called a friend of Rachel's,
who testified that Berriel had called her prior to the encounter and instructed her to get
Rachel away from the house. Three of Berriel's friends also testified for the State. Their
testimonies presented a picture for the jury of the events leading up to the assault: that
Berriel received a call from Rachel, in which she was screaming and crying for Berriel's
help and his protection from Luis; that Berriel had indicated to at least one friend that
he needed to go to Rachel's house because Luis was beating her; that he immediately
turned the car around and drove to Rachel's house; and that Berriel was quiet during
the drive, as though he was "thinking through" his response to Rachel's request. When
they arrived at Rachel and Luis's house, no one was home. As soon as Luis arrived
though, which was at least fifteen minutes after Rachel's call, Berriel ran at Luis with a
9. While section 76-10-507 describes the weapon as "deadly" in its title, the wording of
the statute itself requires only that the weapon be "dangerous." See generally Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-507 (2008). This nominal inconsistency is not an issue on appeal.
f'••'•

-
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knife. The encounter lasted only a few moments during which Berriel stabbed Luis and
then fled. In the car after the assault, Berriel admitted stabbing Luis with the knife.
There was no testimony that suggested that the stabbing was an accident or was
recklessly inflicted. Further, the instruction the jury received regarding culpable mental
state discussed only intent:
In every crime or public offense there must be a union
or joint operation of the act and the defendant's mental state
to commit the act. The defendant's mental state is
manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense
and his sound mind and discretion.
In this case\, the defendant must have acted "intentionally"
or "with intent." Under the law of the State of Utah, a person
engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, under the facts of this case, the weapon possession conviction
is a lesser included offense of the aggravated assault conviction unless the jury could
have found that Berriel possessed the knife with intent to assault from evidence
separate and apart from the facts of the assault itself.
114 The State asserts that there is such an independent basis for the weapon
possession conviction. "In essence, the State [is] argu[ing] that the evidence establishes
that the [possession] and [aggravated assault] convictions were separate acts/' based on
separate facts sufficient to support each conviction. See Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, J 20;
id. 121 (stating that multiple acts may be charged as separate offenses if one could be
committed without necessarily committing the other or they are separated by time and
space sufficient to create an independent ground for a conviction on each offense); see
also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, \ 8, 37 P.3d 1099 (upholding separate convictions for
possession of methamphetamine and possession of equipment or supplies with intent to
engage in a clandestine laboratory operation where the special verdict form indicated
that the clandestine laboratory conviction was based on possession of manufacturing
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equipment rather than the methamphetamine that formed the basis of the possession
conviction).
115 The record evidence, however, does not support a conclusion that the
convictions were based on separate conduct. For example, there is nothing in the record
that shows that Berriel was in possession of the knife with intent to assault prior to the
assault jtself. Rather, the witnesses first place Berriel in possession of a knife as he is
running toward Luis, that is, in the course of actually assaulting him. Indeed, the State
itself, in its closing statement, told the jurors that they might not be able to determine
precisely when Berriel formed his intent to assault Luis, thus conceding by implication
that the same limitation applied to his possession of the knife with the requisite intent
Now whether that was intent on the drive over or whether
or not he formulated that intent in the moment is unclear but he
manifested his intent to fight
It is not [the State's]
burden to show that [Berriel] had the intent to assault on his
drive over. All we have to show is that at some point during
this altercation he did have the intent to do what he did . . . .
(Emphases added.) Although the jury may have been able to draw an inference that
Berriel arrived with the knife based on the fact that he came in his own car and the
absence;of any testimony that Berriel obtained the knife upon arriving, such an
inference does not constitute independent evidence sufficient to uphold separate
convictions because it is necessarily derived from the direct evidence of the assault
itself, i.e., Berriel's possession of the weapon as he charged at Luis.10 See generally United
States v. Gore, 154 F.3d 34, 43-47 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the ''independent evidence"
doctrine adopted by other circuits to require evidence that the defendant actually

i

10. As the State conceded at oral argument, defense counsel's remarks in opening
statement and closing argument that Berriel was in possession of the knife when he
went to the house were not evidence. The trial court properly instructed the jury not to
consider the attorney's statements as fact.
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possessed drugs in addition to the amount he sold to be convicted of both possession of
a controlled substance and distribution of a controlled substance).11
116 Moreover, the jury was not specifically instructed that its convictions for each
offense had to be based on separate evidence. Our precedent is clear that not only must
separate convictions for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode be based on
different facts but that the jury must be so instructed. See generally State v. Chukes, 2003
UT App 155, JJ 23, 26-27, 71 P.3d 624 (vacating the defendant's conviction for forgery
where "the [arguments,] instructions^] and evidence at trial" did not inform the jury
that "it had to find an additional element beyond the elements of [identity fraud] before
it could convict defendant of forgery," that is, the convictions could not be based on the
same forged writings (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State
v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that the forgery offense was
included within the communications fraud conviction where the jury was not
"'required to find7" that the communications fraud was based on separate acts (quoting
State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1988) (per curiam))). Cf Roth, 2001 UT 103, \ 8
(upholding separate convictions where the jury filled out a special verdict form that
indicated that the clandestine laboratory conviction was based on the defendant's
possession of equipment rather than on the possession of the methamphetamine that
formed the basis of the possession conviction). Nothing in the jury instructions
informed the jury that the possession conviction could not be based simply on Berriel's
possession of the knife during the assault, nor did the evidence or assertions of counsel
clarify the matter. Thus, because "the [arguments,] instructions^] and evidence at trial"
did not clearly inform the jury that it had to find a separate factual basis for the
possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault conviction beyond the possession

11. Even if there were evidence that Berriel possessed the knife for some significant
period of time prior to the assault, the lesser included offense limitation may still have
precluded separate convictions. An offense is included within another if "[i]t
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)(b) (2008) (emphasis added). Because
Berriel has not asserted that the possession of the knife was a "form of preparation" to
commit the aggravated assault and because the facts upon which the convictions were
based are so narrow, we need not consider whether Berriel7 s acts prior to committing
the assault were a "form of preparation" and reserve this issue for another day when a
showing of an independent factual basis has been made.
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necessary to commit the aggravated assault, his conviction for possession of the knife
with intent to assault is not independently sustainable. See Chutes, 2003 UT App 155,
1 23 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore vacate
Berriers conviction for possession of a deadly weapon with an intent to assault.
117

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Stephen L. Roth, Judge

118

I CONCUR:

)avis,
ig Judge

THORNE, Judge (concurring and dissenting):
119 I dissent from the majority opinion as to its defense-of-others analysis but concur
as to the remainder. I agree with the majority opinion that, under the circumstances of
this case, Berriel's conviction for possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault
must be vacated as a lesser included offense of his aggravated assault conviction.
However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Berriel was not entitled to a jury
instruction on defense of others. I would reverse both of his convictions on that basis in
addition to vacating the weapons charge on the grounds cited by the majority.
120 Pursuant to Utah Code section 76-2-402, "[a] person is justified in threatening or
using force against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes
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that force . . . is necessary to defend . . . a third person against another person's
imminent use of unlawful force." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 2011). The
statute expressly assigns the questions of imminence and reasonableness to the "trier of
fact" and provides a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered in making that
determination. See id. § 76-2-402(5).1 Although a defendant's entitlement to a defenseof-others instruction is "conditioned upon the existence of a reasonable basis in the
evidence to justify the giving of the proposed instruction," State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211,
1213 (Utah 1980), a requested instruction should be given "if there is any reasonable
basis in the evidence to justify it," State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980)
(emphasis added). See also State v. Garcia, 2001 Utah App 19, ff 8-9,18 P.3d 1123
(discussing self-defense instructions).
^[21 Multiple witnesses testified about a phone call from Rachel to Berriel shortly
before the stabbing, informing Berriel that Luis was beating Rachel. One of Berriel's
companions testified that Rachel's call prompted the group to go to her house to help
her because Luis had been hitting her. Another testified that Rachel was crying because
Luis was hitting her. And a third, Scott Carlisle, testified that Rachel was screaming and
crying on the phone, that he thought Rachel was being beaten because it had happened
before, and that after the phone call Berriel indicated that the group should go to
Rachel's house because she was being beaten up.
122 A reasonable jury could easily conclude from this testimony that, at the time
Berriel spoke with Rachel on the phone, she was in imminent danger and the use of
reasonable force in her defense at that moment would have been justified under the
statute. The question before us is whether Berriel continued to have a reasonable belief
that she remained in imminent danger a short time later,2 when Luis and Rachel arrived

1. These factors include the nature and immediacy of the danger, the probability of
death or serious injury, and prior incidents of violence of relevance to the situation. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(5)(a)-(e) (Supp. 2011).
2. The majority opinion relies on Rachel's testimony that her trip with Luis took fifteen
to twenty minutes and Luis's testimony that the only phone available to Rachel was a
home phone to infer that at least fifteen minutes elapsed between the time of Rachel's
call to Berriel and the subsequent altercation. I am not inclined to reach the same
(continued...)
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home and the altercation between Luis and Berriel occurred. The majority concludes
that from the time Luis arrived home until the time of the stabbing, Luis had not
"threatened, touched, harmed, or even approached Rachel in any way, nor had he
exhibited any weapons/ 7 and that, as a result, "there was no evidence that Rachel was in
imminent danger at the time Berriel attacked Luis." See supra % 5.
123 In my view, once Berriel had a reasonable basis to believe that Rachel was in
imminent danger due to her phone call, his actions in her defense were potentially
justifiable under Utah Code section 76-2-402 until such time as Berriel had reason to
believe that the danger to Rachel had passed.3 There was testimony to suggest that
Berriers observations of Luis's arrival at Rachel's house were too brief and hurried to
have given Berriel notice that Luis no longer posed a threat to Rachel. Carlisle testified
that when he arrived at Rachel's house with Berriel, neither Rachel nor Luis was there.
The State then asked Carlisle, "So what did you do?" Carlisle responded, "We were
walking,back to the car and that guy drove up, her boyfriend, jumped out of the car and
ran towards [Berriel]."
124 Based on this testimony, reasonable jurors could conclude that as soon as Luis
arrived, he jumped from his car and charged at Berried in an angry and hostile manner.
These actions raised the additional issue of self-defense, but they also deprived Berriel
of any meaningful opportunity to revise his assessment of the ongoing danger to
Rachel. Absent such an opportunity, Berriel had insufficient information and
opportunity to believe that the threat to Rachel had dissipated and was therefore
entitled to act in the continued belief that Rachel remained in danger as well as to

2. (...continued)
inference in light of the ubiquitous presence of mobile? phones in today's culture and
particularly amongst young adults. Rachel did not testify as to exactly when or from
where she called Berriel, and in the absence of clear testimony as to the timing of the
phone call, I believe that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the interval
may well have been somewhat less than fifteen minutes.
3. I recognize that the mere passage of time could, in some circumstances, give reason
to infer that a particular threat has ended. However, the potentially quite short period
of time between Rachel's phone call and the ultimate altercation in this case does not
give rise to such an inference.
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defend himself. Carlisle's testimony thus provides some reasonable basis upon which
to conclude that Berriel reasonably believed that Rachel remained in danger and that
using force against Luis in her defense remained justified.4
125 In light of the evidence, an instruction on defense of others was critical to
Berriers defense, not only for its potential to provide an independent justification for his
presence and subsequent actions, but also as a necessary complement to the self-defense
instruction. The jury was instructed that Berriel was not justified in using force in selfdefense if he was the "aggressor/75 and there was certainly evidence to suggest that
Berriel had gone to Rachel's house, armed, with an intent to confront Luis. A defenseof-others instruction would have allowed Berriel to argue that this decision was a
legally justified act in Rachel's defense and did not render Berriel the aggressor as
between Berriel and Luis.6 Thus, the defense-of-others instruction was necessary to
fully implement the self-defense instruction and to provide Berriel with a seamless
defense if he could convince the jury that he first acted in defense of Rachel and then
transitioned into also defending himself as Luis turned his violence towards him.

4. Carlisle's version of events, if believed, distinguishes this case from the authorities
the majority cites in which the person to be defended was either not present or had
clearly broken free from the hostilities. See Harris v. Scully, 779 F.2d 875, 877, 879 (2d
Cir. 1985) (denying instruction where defendant's mother apparently remained inside a
house, altercation took place outside the house, and defendant's brother had broken
free from the fight); State v. Hernandez, 861 P.2d 814, 820 (Kan. 1993) (denying
instruction where person allegedly defended was not present).
5. The instruction stated, in part, "A person is not justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury if he: . . . was the aggressor or
was engaged in combat by agreement
"
6. Such an argument was particularly vital here, where Berriel was charged with
possession of a weapon with intent to assault. The jury could have concluded that
Berriel possessed the weapon at the time of the phone call and at all times thereafter.
Thus, it was critical for Berriel to be allowed to argue that his possession of the knife
was with a legally-justifiable intent to potentially defend Rachel or himself if necessary,
rather than any intent to commit a criminal assault against Luis.

,
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126 I also note that it is highly relevant that the threat to Rachel was one of domestic
violence. This court has recognized on multiple occasions that "a domestic violence
complaint is one of the most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations confronting
police/7 State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005 UT App 65,116,108 P.3d 123 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219,1 25, 51 P.3d 55 (same); State v.
Richards, 779 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (same). In State v. Vallasenor-Meza, 2005
UT App 65,108 P.3d 123, police responded to reports of a domestic dispute at the
defendant's house. The defendant was initially reluctant to cooperate with the officers,
but eventually "explained to the officers that there had been a fight, but the woman
involved had since gone to work." Id. 1 18. Despite this explanation, the court
determined that exigent circumstances justified the oifficers entering the house without a
warrant due to their reasonable belief that "the victim was potentially inside the
residence injured or unconscious, and that their immediate intervention was necessary/7

Id.\\9.
127 If the jury was to believe Carlisle's version of events, Berriel's defense-of-others
claim seems even stronger than the claim of police exigency in Vallasenor-Meza. Berriel
was aware of a history of domestic violence between Luis and Rachel, became aware of
a new and potentially ongoing domestic violence incident perpetrated by Luis against
Rachel, and went to assist Rachel against that clear threat. When Berriel came into
contact with Luis and Rachel, it was not obvious that their hostilities were continuing
but it was also not obvious that they had ceased. Berriel did not know if Rachel was
"injured or unconscious," see id., if she was being held in Luis's vehicle against her will
or under duress of his threats, or if Luis's beating of her would continue as soon as Luis
was not busy driving. Importantly, Berriel's ability to confirm that Rachel was no
longer in danger was short-circuited by Luis's jumping from the car and running at
Berriel—an aggressive act that was entirely consistent with the violence against Rachel
that had,brought Berriel to the scene in the first place.
128 In light of Carlisle's testimony, the interplay between self-defense and defense of
others in this case, and the clear and very real danger presented by Luis's repeated acts
of domestic violence, Berriel was entitled to his requested instruction on the defense of
others.7 The district court's refusal to give such an instruction deprived Berriel of the

7. Of course, a jury would not be obligated to ultimately find the facts in Berriel's favor
on his defense-of-others defense or any other issue. Nevertheless, he was entitled to
make his arguments to a properly instructed jury.
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opportunity to present a full and fair defense and, in my opinion, merits reversal of his
convictions. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on this
issue but concur in the remainder.

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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